

DanMUN 2011

Briefing for the Security Council

The Security Council shall convene to address the current challenges to peace and security in Somalia and its surrounding waters



Abbreviations

United Nations Security Council	-	UNSC
Responsibility to Protect	-	R2P
African Union	-	AU
African Union Peace and Security Council	-	AUPSC
Transitional Federal Government in Somalia	-	TFG
Transitional Federal Institutions in Somalia	-	TFIs
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia	-	ARS
Formed Policy Units	-	FPU
Concepts of Operations	-	CONOPs
Islamic Courts Union	-	ICU
International Maritime Bureau	-	IMB
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia	-	CGPCS

Introduction

Somalia is a fragile state¹ with great regional differences located at the tip of the Horn of Africa. Recently, it has also been the scene of a food security crisis² including the officially declared famine in five regions of the southern part of the country. Security and stability are necessary preconditions to human and economic development.

The situation in the Somali Republic is critical and continues to have a destabilizing effect on the whole of the region. It goes beyond Somalia due to the largely unsolved issue of pirate insurgents ruling the Somali Republic waters. There is no easy solution and out of many initiatives only a few have had a positive impact.

The UNSC, as the main body ensuring international peace and security, is required to assist a fragile regime holding a transitional government mandate. The Security Council is therefore requested to convene to come up with a comprehensive, holistic and sustainable response to the challenges to peace and security faced by the Somali Republic.

Before DanMUN 2011

The Security Council has on several occasions invited the international community to deal with the continuing challenges faced by Somalia (see annexed list of resolutions). As representative of your country, you are requested to consider – in collaboration with your co-delegates – how the international community can assist Somalia with its security challenges, and how to materialize efforts to counter the immense security and humanitarian issues in the best manner possible.

¹ Some experts has avoided the term 'State', when referring to Somalia since 1991, when the government was overthrown as this gives a wrong picture of the region split by de facto rules lacking a central government

² The UN has estimated that \$2.5 billion is needed for the humanitarian response in the Horn of Africa.

The briefing on Somalia, which you will find below, is a basic outline of the situation, invigorating the issue to the top of the agenda of the UNSC.

Your primary task prior to DanMUN 2011 will be to conduct research on the past and present policies of your country in relation to Somalia, and the instability in the region of the African Horn as a whole. For ideas on how to approach this research, we kindly refer your attention to the **DanMUN 2011 Preparation Guide**.

In the course of your research, you and your co-delegates should ask yourselves a number of relevant questions, such as:

- **Who are your primary partners in the UN as a whole, and in the current [UNSC](#), and which relations are relevant considering the instability in Somalia?**
- **What is your recent national policy Somalia and the Horn of Africa in relation to peace and security?**
- **How does your country feel about sovereignty and the [UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect \(R2P\)](#)?**
- **Is your country in favor of the UN's support to African Union Mission Somalia by the African Union (AMISOM), and does your country have any constraints or concerns in regards to the work of the group on the ground?**
- **What is your country position on intervention, military and otherwise, across sovereign borders?**
- **What is your country's perspective on terrorist groups, in concrete, what initiatives and responses have you been in favor of in regards to Ethiopian Al-Shabbab's continued presence in the Somali Republic?**
- **What is your country's perception and response measures on the issue of piracy and what role can international law and, in general, the rule of law play in regards to piracy?**

- **Is international naval deployment a viable option, and from the perspective of your country, how should this be materialized?**

These questions are just a few among many relevant issues that we expect you to have conducted some research on prior to your arrival at DanMUN 2011. You will, in collaboration with your co-delegates, be confronted with the task of addressing these challenging issues, and eventually form a resolution for a more stable and secure Somalia and region.

After having read the following briefing as well as the **DanMUN 2011 Preparation Guide**, we trust that you will arrive well prepared for DanMUN 2011.

It is our experience that preparation is the key to qualified discussions and negotiations during the conference.

Scenario briefing

Brief overview of the Somali history and geography

I. Background

Comprised of a former British protectorate and an Italian colony, the Somali Republic was formed in 1960 when the two territories merged. However, only latent progress has been noticeable in the country at the tip of the African Horn. Somalia is bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Kenya to the



southwest, the Gulf of Aden with Yemen to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, and Ethiopia to the west. The country has the longest coastline on the African continent. With per capita GDP of \$600 per year, Somalia remains one of the world's poorest countries. Millions of Somalis depend on food aid. According to the World Bank, as much as 73% of the population lived on a daily income below \$2 in 2008

The Political situation and the Transitional Federal Government

Since President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991 and the civil war was initiated, the Somali Republic has been without an effective central government. This unfortunate and instable political environment persists even though several attempts to establish a unified central government have been made. Years of fighting between rival warlords and an inability to deal with famine and disease have led to the deaths of up to one million people.

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established in 2004 in Nairobi, and it is the current internationally recognized government of the Somali Republic, backed by among others the UN, the United States of America and the African Union. A substantial number of interruptions to the TFG's rule in 2006 eventually resulted in the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to assume control of much of the country. ICU, an Islamist organization, promptly imposed Shari'a law, which it more or less maintained until 2007. Striving for a peaceful resolution, between May 31 and June 9, 2008, representatives of the TFG and the moderate Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), a group of Islamist rebels, gathered for peace talks in Djibouti brokered by the former United Nations Special Envoy to Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The main issue was to ensure a cessation of the neighboring Ethiopias troops occupation, which had been occupying Somaliand territory from 2006 to 2009. The outcome of the conference resulted in a signed [Djibouti Agreement](#) calling for the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in exchange for the cessation of armed confrontation.

At the same occasion the Parliamentary capacity was expanded to 550 seats, which was deemed a necessity to accommodate proportional membership of ARS in the Somali Parliament. Consequentially, former ARS chairman, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was elected as President. After his own election, President Sharif shortly afterwards appointed Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, the son of slain and former President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as the nation's new Prime Minister.

The TFG sought to reestablish its authority, and with the assistance of Ethiopian troops, peacekeepers of the African Union and air support by the United States, managed to drive out the rival ICU, and solidify its rule. However, the terrorist group Al Shabbab maintains to challenge the security and stability in Somalia.

UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon, has on several occasions urged the international community to strengthen its presence in Somalia. The Secretary General urges support of the TFG, also financially, as a continued support to the fragile transitional governance mechanism is vital for the future of Somalia. Accordingly, the TFG has recently mobilized domestic resources to finance some of its own initiatives, which according to the Secretary General illustrates that the TFG is gradually increasing the expectations of an increased independence. This is a significant step towards outspoken commitment for the TFG, which has a wish to form a government that is capable of combining the current parties as well as parties that currently remain outsiders to the comprehensive peace process.

The African Union and AMISOM

The African Union has been an important driving force behind the development under way in the Somali Republic, and continues to play a very central role. In operational terms, this is in particular due to the deployment of the peace supporting entity AMISOM. AMISOM is an active, regional peacekeeping mission in Somalia created by the AU's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007. Since then, AMISOM's initial six months mandate has been approved by the UN Security Council in Resolutions 1801 (2008). AMISOM is mandated to support the TFG as well as the structures comprised of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). The mission also holds a role with regards to the implementation of a national security plan, training of the Somali security and police forces, and assisting in creating a secure environment for delivery of humanitarian aid. The latter point has been an urgent and pressing issue due to the famine, which continues to characterize the region.



The northwestern part of the country has been relatively stable under the self-declared, but unrecognized, quasi-sovereign state of Somaliland. The issue of Somaliland remains to be settled, and continues to defy the legitimacy of the central government. Furthermore, the de facto self-governing region of Puntland declared itself to be autonomous, but did not request complete independence from Somalia.

The recent humanitarian catastrophe in second and third quarter of 2011

Over the past couple of years a severe drought has affected the entire East African region. Said to be "the worst in 60 years", the drought has caused a severe food crisis across Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. It continues to threaten the livelihood of more than 13.3 million people. Many refugees from southern Somalia have fled to neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia, where crowded, unsanitary conditions, together with severe malnutrition, have led to a large number of deaths. Other countries in and around the Horn of Africa, including Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan and parts of Uganda, are also affected by a food crisis. The famine has forced more than 920,000 refugees to flee into neighboring countries adding additional pressure on the regional instability. In the summer of 2010 the UN officially declared a famine in several regions of Somalia with the south being the worst.

Issues for Resolution

I. Al-Shabaab: Terrorism and the international responsibility to assist member states

Fears of the Al-Shabaab insurgents, who control most of southern Somalia, still hinder humanitarian operations in the region, since access to the people in need is severely insecure. This has caused the UN



Al-Shabaab Spokesperson

agencies to '*a dialogue*' with al-Shabaab about securing airstrips in areas under the insurgent group's control in order to deliver aid.

In a statement by Al-Shabaab's spokesman, Sheikh Ali Dhere, he indicated that his organization had no issue with allowing "Muslims and non-Muslims to help the drought affected people". According to the spokesperson, however, aid workers will "only be permitted to work if they do not have other interests".

In the end of July 2011, the AU peacekeepers were heavily involved against Al-Shabaab militants in northern Mogadishu, in an effort to protect famine relief efforts from attacks. Six were killed during the confrontation, and key territory was seized from the insurgents of Al-Shabaab. At this occasion, media and NGOs have found reason to make allegations against Al-Shabaab members of having intimidated, kidnapped and killed aid workers.

The Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, has hailed the AMISOM peacekeepers and TFG's forces for their commitment and courage in dealing with Al Shabaab and expelling them from Mogadishu. Consequently, he has asked the UN to expand its support to AMISOM and enable it to put its mandate into more effective operation. Thus, at a recent convening concerning the situation in Somalia, the AU encouraged the TFG and AMISOM to take 'all necessary means' in pursuance of the [Djibouti Agreement of 19 August 2008](#) and the [Kampala Accord of 9 June 2011](#).

A direct call for support was effected, when presented by the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in its [communiqué PSC/PR/COMM\(CCXCIII\)](#) from its 293rd meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. AUPSC, in clause 14 of its Communiqué:

"Requests the UN Security Council, in line with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to reaffirm its commitment to authorize the deployment of a

United Nations operation to take over AMISOM and support the long term reconstruction and stabilisation of Somalia. In the meantime, [AUSC] Council requests the [UN] Security Council to authorize the enhancement of the support package provided by the United Nations, under resolution 1863 (2009) and 1964 (2010), to take into account the shortcomings identified over the past few months and the fact that AMISON is a multidimensional mission with military, police and civilian components with particular focus on:

- (i) Self-sustenance of the troops,
- (ii) reimbursement for contingent owned equipment,
- (iii) provisions of the requisite enablers, including helicopters,
- (iv) deployment of Formed Police Units (FPUs), as provided for in the revised CONOPs,
- (v) logistical support for the civilian components of the Mission,
- (vi) creation, as part of AMISOM and under its command, of a guard force of a battalion size (850), to provide security for civilian staff and protection for the AU, the UN and the TFIs in Mogadishu, it being clearly understood that this force should be in addition to the 12 000 strength already authorized by the UN Security Council under resolution 1964 (2010) and
- (vii) welfare and travel for the personnel of the Mission;



Accordingly, the UN Security Council on 30 September 2011 adopted the wide ranging [Resolution 2010 \(2011\)](#)³, which overall accounts for many of the issues of concern according to the above Communique from the AUSC (resolution 2010 is annexed to this document)

The role of AMISOM is vital and the support from the UNSC is instrumental for the mission, benefitting from legitimacy, financial and logistics assistance mandate by the UNSC. The African Union has recently renewed a call for the UN Security Council to

³ The resolutions can also be found in the appendix

authorize the deployment of 20,000 peacekeepers to Somalia in the wake of the recent victory against the Al Shabaab militants in Mogadishu.

Recent events in Somalia

On Tuesday 4 October 2011, insurgents of the extremist group Al-Shabaab killed 70 people and wounded several more in a terrorist attack. The explosion took place outside a ministry in the capital Mogadishu. The majority of the dead and injured were students waiting outside the ministry. The Somali president Sheikh Sharif Ahmed strongly condemns the attack, and has called for three days of mourning.

Attacking the ministries of the transitional government is considered a means for the Al-Shabaab to shatter any public confidence in the TFG, and to ensure that any new regime in Somalia will be undermined.

Al-Shabaab has not since August been present in Mogadishu, and the conditions were considered to have improved. The recent terrorist attack indicates that Al-Shabab still poses a threat to peace in Somalia, and that the TFG has not been able to fully destabilise the power of Al-Shabaab.


Special Rapporteur* on human rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari, said: "these attacks, which targeted some of the country's very few university-level students, as well as the dedicated civil servants working to enhance Somali public institutions and social services under extremely difficult circumstances, are a direct blow to the fabric – and future – of the nation."

The lack of governmental control in most areas of Somalia is now questioning whether Somalia is ready for governmental elections. As long as the Al-Shabaab remains powerful, the future of Somalia remains uncertain.

II. Piracy: a sustained challenge to international peace and security

The issue of piracy: Reasons for piracy, international response and legal issues at stake


The long-standing absence of authority in the country has led to Somali pirates becoming a major threat to international shipping in the area. The piracy is to date unsolved, although the UN in cooperation with NATO have formed several anti-piracy operations. The main challenge that remains unsolved is that no proper law enforcement mechanism exists to counter the piracy challenge. Pirates earn up to millions of dollars for each ship seized and has only few other ways of making a living – none as profitable as piracy. In recent years, piracy has become an attractive opportunity for young Somali men. Warships from around the world have been sent to deter attacks by patrolling off the Somali coast. Pirates have responded by venturing further out – causing hijackings to occur as far out as near India, making piracy a challenge beyond the situation within the Somali Republic.



Experts agree that the only long-term solution to the problem of piracy is to define a situation of law and order on land. Short-term solutions are, however, also needed. Cooperative efforts in the shape of recent donor-funded peace conferences failed to persuade the rivaling Somali leaders to put down their weapons and work together.

History and the raison d'être of piracy

In 2008 the amount of pirate attacks rose on an unprecedented scale, and once again the



international community laid their focus on Somalia. Before 2008 most attacks occurred along the East coast of Somalia. The targeted ships were mainly of the World Food Programme (WFP) from Mombasa headed to Mogadishu with humanitarian aid. These attacks affected mainly the Somali population, keeping

the essential aid from those in need.

In 2008, this changed significantly as the attacks started occurring off the north coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden - the busiest international maritime trade route in the world. The attacks have risen, not only in their sheer numbers, but also in their boldness. Pirates have begun attacking very large ships, and their attacks illustrated a disturbingly high degree of professionalism. All the attacks were undertaken with sufficient weaponry, however, only rare cases involved violence against the crewmembers of the seized ships.

Pirates use modern technology, and utilize fast deployable ships together with a mother ship, from which they plan and execute their attacks. They seize the ships together with their crew, and demand ransom, which eventually is being paid in often rather large sums. According to the industry

In an effort to collaborate to counter piracy, the international community initiated a deployment of joint naval task forces in the Gulf of Aden, the attacks started to spread upon a much larger area. Now it reaches all the way to the Persian Gulf, the coast of India on the East, the city of Mombasa, and the Seychelles Islands on the South. The area of the attacks is now of such a grand scale that it is virtually impossible to maintain control of it

by military means.

According to reports and studies, several factors have affected the major rise of piracy in the area:

1. The extreme socio-economic situation of the Somali population, further escalated by the Ethiopian invasion (2006-2009) and Al-Shabaab insurgencies, which have left most of the population without any legal sources of income
2. Alleged illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping in the Somali waters severely damaged the fishing business in the area, and the fishermen were left with no choice. Some Pirate groups even refer to themselves as “protectors” of their local communities and maritime environment
3. One of the main reasons for piracy is the severe situation on shore. Somalia has not been a functional state since 1991, and the current Transitional Federal Government has no means to control the country. Neither a coast guard nor navy patrols the shores, and no police force can strike the most profound pirate bases onshore
4. The waters around Somalia are one of the busiest international maritime trade routes in the world with many ships passing the coast of Somalia every day. When the international deployment forced some of the pirates outside the Gulf of Aden, most of the attacks now occur on open seas

Response Initiatives and Measures

After the counterproductive, or even catastrophic, engagements of both the US and the UN at the beginning of 1990's (including the infamous *Black Hawk Down* incident), Somalia virtually disappeared on the radar of international attention. Some experts denounces this development to actually having helped the stabilization of Somalia, as the clan structure together with the Islamic courts



managed to maintain some sort of order. However, when the pirates started to target international commerce shipping industry, instead of 'just' the humanitarian aid ships, the response of the international community changed swiftly. As a direct response, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed two resolutions addressing the issue of piracy (UNSCR 1816 and UNSCR 1838). UNSC utilized the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS⁴) and offered wide measures of combating piracy, including boarding and seizing of the suspected pirate vessels. Furthermore, it reflected the calls of the TFG and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) for international intervention on the case of piracy with an implicit authorization to use force, and to deploy naval vessels and military equipment in the area.

The first naval deployment came with Combined Task Force 150 (CTF150), under the US led 'Operation Enduring Freedom' framework. The CTF150 was then complemented with CTF151, which was set up in 2009 specifically to combat piracy. Second was NATO, first with the operation "Allied Provider" followed by the "Operation Ocean Shield" This NATO led operation includes among others: the United States, the UK, Germany, Denmark, Portugal and several non-NATO countries such as: Seychelles, China, India and Russia. EU also deployed its own mission codenamed "Operation Atlanta," with France and Spain as main providers of vessels. This EU mission is in accordance with the EU Council Joint Action 2008/851 and EU Council Decision 2008/918. It is more focused on the protection of the WFP vessels, and on monitoring of any fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. However, in accordance to the UNSCR 1814, 1816 and 1838, Atlanta's vessels are authorized to use force to repress acts of piracy.

Furthermore, states such as Iran operate navy vessels independently. This is a consequence of the rather ambiguous position defined by the UN which gives individual countries the right to pursue operations in the Somali waters, however, with a support of

⁴ Somalia has signed the UNCLOS

Somalia although this notion of support has not been defined properly due to the transitional status of the TFG. Albeit China and India form allegiance to the NATO led operations, the Chinese and Indian fleets operate independently, and do not adhere to the NATO chain of command. Also, the naval deployment proved that the issue of piracy no longer is a local problem of one state, but a complicated issue with global impact.

Currently all 5 UNSC permanent members have their vessels deployed in the area around Somalia and the Indian Ocean. Despite the

number of countries involved in the operations, despite some successes such as the rescue of the Alabama Mærsk crew members by the US Navy Seals, and a positively declining trend in the last 6 months (17 ships and 393 crew were held hostage as of 11 July



2011, compared to 26 ships and 573 hostages in March 2011), the naval deployment cannot prevent all attacks. They most certainly cannot change the reasons for why Somalis decide to begin a life as pirates. Essentially, the challenges also lie with the fact that a rule of law is currently not present to employ in situations of hijacked ships. It is thus an important matter to the international community how to proceed with the naval deployment in the area.

Legal Concerns of Piracy and International Cooperation

UNCLOS Article 105

Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft

"On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith." - [UNCLOS](#)

The naval deployment and action of the international community vessels constitute an interesting case about the application of maritime law. As mentioned, the deployment of naval forces in the area is in accordance to relevant UNSC resolutions and utilizes

UNCLOS, particularly articles 100 to 107 and 110. The most important one is article 105, which allows military vessels to engage ships under the control of pirates, and authorize the states of the respective vessels to prosecute the pirates.

This has though created a problem. States capturing the pirates have a right to prosecute them, but there is a general reluctance to implement this. This was the case for the Danish warship Absalon, where confusion about the legal status of the captured pirates led to their eventual release without a legal process.

In 2008, UNSC started addressing this issue when the resolution 1851 asked for the creation of the The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). CGPCS was created as a voluntary international forum with nearly 70 participating countries, several international organizations such as the EU, NATO, the African Union, the Arab League, the International Maritime Organization, and various UN bodies and agencies. CGPCS is organized in several working groups focusing on several areas:

- Working Group 1: **Military and Operational Coordination, Information Sharing, and Capacity Building**, chaired by the United Kingdom, focusing on force generation, operational coordination and capacity-building;
- Working Group 2: **Judicial Issues**, chaired by Denmark, focusing on judicial mechanisms for deterring piracy;
- Working Group 3: **Strengthening Shipping Self-Awareness and Other Capabilities**, chaired by the United States, works closely with the commercial shipping industry to enhance awareness and improve capabilities;
- Working Group 4: **Public Information**, chaired by Egypt, seeks to make clear to the world, - especially to the Somali public, the damages being made by pirates; and
- Working Group 5: **Financial Flows**, chaired by Italy, focuses on the illicit financial flows associated with piracy in order to disrupt the pirate enterprise ashore.

Working group 2 is thus focusing on the issue of potential prosecution of pirates. The results of working group 2 were eventually formulated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1976 (2011) on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia, and in the Report by the UN Secretary-General on 14 June 2011 on the modalities for the establishment of specialized Somali anti-piracy courts.

This is considered being crucial to the CGPCS as they state that: *“the urgent need to increase the number of prosecutions as a top priority even if more than 1,000 pirates are detained and prosecuted in 20 jurisdictions across the world”* – [9th plenary session report](#)

All in all the peace and security have faced the global community on many recent occasions, but the situation is that the Somali Republic needs the support and action of the Security Council.

ANNEX 1: UNSC Resolutions

UNSCR on Somalia
1814 (2008)
1816 (2008)
1838 (2008)
1846 (2008)
1851 (2008)
1897 (2009)
1918 (2010)
1950 (2010)
1976 (2011)

Copy of the UNSC Resolution 2010 (2011)

United Nations
Security Council

S/RES/2010 (2011)

Distr.: General
30 September 2011

Resolution 2010 (2011)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6626th meeting,
on 30 September 2011

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President concerning the situation in Somalia, protection of civilians in armed conflict, women and peace and security, and children and armed conflict,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Reiterating its commitment to a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the situation in Somalia,

Reiterating its full support for the Djibouti Peace Process and the Transitional Federal Charter which provide the framework for reaching a lasting political solution in Somalia, *recognizing* the need to promote reconciliation and dialogue among the Somali population, and *stressing* the importance of broad-based and representative institutions reached through a political process ultimately inclusive of all,

Reaffirming its support for the Transitional Federal Government in its role as part of the Djibouti Peace Process, *stressing* the primary responsibility of the Transitional Federal Institutions to work in a cohesive and united

manner and to intensify their efforts to complete the transitional tasks set out by the Djibouti Agreement and the Transitional Charter, and calling on the Transitional Federal Institutions to coordinate closely with other Somali groups, including local and regional administrations,

Reiterating its emphasis on the need for a comprehensive strategy to encourage the establishment of peace and security in Somalia through the collaborative effort of all stakeholders,

Commending the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Dr. Augustine Mahiga, as well as that of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia (SRCC) Ambassador Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra and *reaffirming* its strong support for their efforts,

Welcoming the work of former President Jerry Rawlings as the African Union High Representative for Somalia,

Recalling the signing of the Kampala Accord on 9 June 2011, *noting* the decision to defer elections of the President and Speaker and his deputies for 12 months until 20 August 2012 under the terms of the Accord and *strongly urging* the signatories to honour their obligations,

Welcoming the agreement of a roadmap, facilitated by SRSR Mahiga, at the Consultative Meeting held in Mogadishu on 6 September, that sets out key tasks and priorities to be delivered by the Transitional Federal Institutions over the next 12 months, with clear timelines, benchmarks and compliance mechanisms, *urging* the Transitional Federal Institutions as holding the primary responsibility for implementing the roadmap, and the other signatories, to adhere to their commitments in the roadmap, and *noting* that future support for the Transitional Federal Institutions will be contingent upon completion of these tasks,

Recognizing that peace and stability in Somalia depend on reconciliation and effective governance across the whole of Somalia and *urging* all Somali parties to renounce violence and to work together to build peace and stability,

Urging the Transitional Federal Institutions to increase their transparency and combat corruption to increase their legitimacy and credibility, and to enable continued support from the international community,

Expressing grave concern at the dire and worsening humanitarian situation in Somalia and the impact of the drought and famine on the people of Somalia, in particular women and children, *calling on* all parties in accordance with international humanitarian law to allow for safe and unhindered access to humanitarian agencies at this critical time, and *underscoring* the importance of upholding the principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity and independence in the provision of humanitarian assistance,

Strongly condemning the targeting, obstruction or prevention of the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia by any parties, especially armed groups, and *deploring* any attacks on humanitarian personnel,

Expressing serious concern that the United Nations consolidated appeal for Somalia is not fully funded, *stressing* the need for urgent mobilisation of resources to those in need and *calling on* all Member States to contribute to current and future consolidated humanitarian appeals,

Commending the contribution of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to lasting peace and stability in Somalia, *recognizing* the significant sacrifices made by these forces, *expressing* its appreciation for the continued commitment of troops and equipment to AMISOM by the Governments of Uganda and Burundi, and *calling on* other African Union Member States to consider contributing troops to AMISOM,

Reiterating its serious concern at the continued fighting in Somalia and its impact on the civilian population, *condemning* all attacks, including terrorist attacks on the Transitional Federal Government, AMISOM and the civilian population by armed opposition groups, and foreign fighters, particularly Al Shabaab, and *stressing* the terrorist threat that Somali armed opposition groups, and foreign fighters, particularly Al Shabaab, constitute for Somalia and for the international community,

Welcoming recent improvements in the security situation in Mogadishu, *commending* the efforts of AMISOM and the Somali Security Forces, *encouraging* them to consolidate these gains and *urging* the Transitional Federal Institutions to capitalise upon the improved security situation by promptly facilitating agreement on and the implementation of a stabilisation plan for Mogadishu and by facilitating the delivery of basic services and providing good governance to all of its citizens,

Calling on the Transitional Federal Government to remain united and redouble its efforts to complete the priority tasks and goals agreed on in the Roadmap paving the ground for a better future for Somalis, including their economic and social development and the realization of their human rights, while *recognizing* the need for the cooperation and support of the international community to the Transitional Federal Government, local and regional administrations in this regard,

Reaffirming the importance of the re-establishment, training, equipping and retention of Somali security forces, which is vital for the long-term stability and security of Somalia, *expressing* support for the on-going European Union Training Mission Somalia, *emphasizing* the importance of coordinated, timely and sustained support from the international community, and *encouraging* the Somali security forces to demonstrate their effectiveness by working with AMISOM to consolidate security throughout Mogadishu,

Commending Member States and organizations which have made contributions in support of AMISOM and Somalia, *encouraging* the international community to mobilize additional funding as appropriate, recognizing the importance of timely and predictable funding, and *stressing* the need for effective coordination among donors, the United Nations and the African Union,

Recalling its resolutions 1950 (2010) and 1976 (2011), *expressing* its grave concern at the threat posed by piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, *recognizing* that the ongoing instability in Somalia contributes to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, and hostage taking, *stressing* the need for a comprehensive response to tackle piracy, including the need to investigate and prosecute those who illicitly finance, plan, organize, or unlawfully profit from pirate attacks, and its underlying causes by the international community and the Transitional Federal Institutions and *welcoming* the efforts of the Contact Group for Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, States and international and regional organizations,

Welcoming the Secretary-General's report dated 30 August 2011 (S/2011/549), and its recommendations for continued action on the political, security and recovery tracks by the Transitional Federal Institutions with the support of the international community,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to authorize the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment until 31 October 2012 of AMISOM, which shall be authorized to take all necessary measures to carry out its existing mandate as set out in paragraph 9 of resolution 1772 (2007), and *requests* the African Union to urgently increase its force strength to its mandated level of 12,000 uniformed personnel, thereby enhancing its ability to carry out its mandate;

2. *Calls upon* the Transitional Federal Institutions to abide by the terms of the roadmap of key tasks and priorities to be delivered by the Transitional Federal Institutions over the next 12 months, with clear timelines, benchmarks and compliance mechanisms, *notes* the Security Council's future support to the Transitional Federal

Institutions will be contingent upon the completion of these tasks, and *requests* the Secretary-General to provide an update on progress made by the Transitional Federal Institutions against the roadmap in his reports to the Security Council;

3. *Notes* the recommendations on Somalia by the African Union Peace and Security Council of 13 September 2011 and *underlines* its intention to keep the situation on the ground under review and to take into account in its future decisions on AMISOM, progress by the Transitional Federal Institutions in completing the key tasks as set out in the roadmap referred to in paragraph 2 above;

4. *Welcomes* the steps taken by UNPOS and other United Nations offices and agencies, including the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), to increase the presence of the United Nations organizations and their staff in Somalia as an important element of the effective fulfilment of their mandate, and *urges* the establishment of a more permanent and increasing presence by the United Nations to Somalia, in particular in Mogadishu, consistent with the security conditions, as outlined in the Secretary-General's reports (S/2010/447) and (S/2009/210);

5. *Recalling* the African Union's Chairperson's report of 13 September 2011 and the Secretary-General's report of 30 August 2011 (S/2011/549), *agrees* that an increase in United Nations organizations and their staff, and other official international visitors in Mogadishu is placing additional pressure on AMISOM to provide security, escort and protection services, *encourages* the United Nations to work with the African Union to develop a guard force of an appropriate size, within AMISOM's mandated troop levels, to provide security, escort and protection services to personnel from the international community, including the United Nations, and *expresses* its intention to review and consider thoroughly the possible need to adjust the mandated troop levels of AMISOM when the mission reaches its current mandated level of 12,000 troops;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide technical and expert advice to the African Union in the planning and deployment of AMISOM, through the United Nations Office to the African Union, including on AMISOM Concept of Operations;

7. *Welcomes* the progress made by AMISOM in reducing civilian casualties during its operations, *urges* AMISOM to continue to undertake its efforts to prevent civilian casualties and to develop an effective approach to the protection of civilians as requested by the African Union Peace and Security Council;

8. *Requests* AMISOM to continue to assist the Transitional Federal Government in the development of the Somali Police Force and the National Security Force, in particular the implementation of an effective chain of command and control of the Somali Security Forces and to assist the integration of Somali units trained by other member States or organizations inside and outside Somalia;

9. *Noting* the important role an effective police presence can play in the stabilization of Mogadishu, *stresses* the need to continue to develop an effective Somali police force and *welcomes* the desire of the African Union to develop a police component within AMISOM;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package for AMISOM called for by resolution 1863 (2009) for a maximum of 12,000 AMISOM uniformed personnel, including the Guard Force referred to in paragraph 5 above, comprising equipment and services, including public information support, but not including the transfer of funds, as described in the Secretary-General's letter (S/2009/60) to the Security Council until 31 October 2012, ensuring the accountability and transparency of expenditure of United Nations funds as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 1910 (2010);

11. *Decides* on an exceptional basis and due to the unique character of this mission, to extend the logistical support package for AMISOM for a maximum of 12,000 troops as described in the exchange of letters between the

Secretary-General of 21 September 2011 (S/2011/591) and the President of the Security Council of 29 September 2011 (S/2011/602) whilst continuing to ensure maximum efficiency and engagement of relevant bilateral support;

12. *Considers* that counter-Improvised Explosive Device and explosive ordnance disposal activities, as described in the Secretary-General's letter (S/2009/60) to the Security Council, may be provided through the logistical support package, whilst continuing to ensure maximum efficiency and engagement of relevant bilateral support;

13. *Recalls* its statement of intent regarding the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation as expressed in resolution 1863 (2009), and *notes* that any decision to deploy such an operation would take into account inter alia the

conditions set out in the Secretary-General's reports dated 16 April 2009 (S/2009/210) and 30 December 2010 (S/2010/675), and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the steps identified in paragraphs 82-86 of his report (S/2009/210), subject to the conditions in this report;

14. *Reiterates* its call to Member States and regional and international organizations to support AMISOM through the provision of equipment, technical assistance, and funding without caveats to the United Nations Trust Fund for AMISOM, or to make direct bilateral donations in support of AMISOM, including for the urgent need for the reimbursement of contingent owned equipment, and for the provision of compassionate flights for AMISOM troops, and *encourages* donors to work closely with the United Nations and African Union in order to ensure that the appropriate funds and equipment are promptly provided;

15. *Emphasizes* that in order to ensure Somalia's long-term security effective development of Somali Security Forces is needed, and *reiterates* its call to Member States, regional, and international organizations to contribute generously and promptly to the United Nations Trust Fund for the Somali security institutions, and to offer assistance to the Somali security forces, including through training, technical assistance and equipment in coordination with AMISOM, consistent with paragraphs 11 (b) and 12 of resolution 1772 (2007);

16. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to assist the Transitional Federal Government in developing the transitional security institutions, including the Somali Police Force, and the National Security Force, and to continue to support the Transitional Federal Government in developing a Somali-owned national security strategy, which reflects respect for the rule of law and the protection of human rights, as well as the legal and policy framework for the operation of its security forces including governance, vetting and oversight mechanisms;

17. *Reaffirms* that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon by paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) shall not apply to supplies and technical assistance provided in accordance with paragraph 11 (b) and 12 of resolution 1772 (2007) to the Transitional Federal Government for the purposes of the development of its security sector institutions, consistent with the Djibouti peace process and subject to the notification procedure set out in paragraph 12 of resolution 1772 (2007);

18. *Reiterates* its call on all Somali parties to support the Djibouti Agreement, and calls for the end of all hostilities, acts of armed confrontation and efforts to undermine stability in Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government;

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative to continue to extend his good offices to facilitate reconciliation amongst all Somalis and the peace process in general, with the support of the international community, including, as appropriate, support to reconciliation and peace efforts at the local level;

20. *Notes* the important role regional administrations and civil society can play in the political process and encourages intensified dialogue and political outreach with these groups by the Transitional Federal Institutions;

21. *Encourages* the international community to provide, as part of the continuing support to Somalia, further support to peacebuilding, capacity-building and good governance efforts in areas of relative stability within Somalia, including but not limited to, Somaliland and Puntland;

22. *Condemns* all attacks against civilians in Somalia, *calls* for the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including sexual and gender based violence, or abuses committed against civilians, including women and children, and humanitarian personnel in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law and *stresses* the responsibility of all parties in Somalia to comply with their obligations to protect the civilian population from the effects of hostilities, in particular by avoiding any indiscriminate attacks or excessive use of force;

23. *Expresses* serious concern about the reports of continuing human rights violations in Somalia and *stresses* the importance to investigate these alleged human rights violations and to bring those responsible to justice;

24. *Recalls* the conclusions endorsed by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict in Somalia (S/AC.51/2011/2), *calls* on all parties to end grave violations and abuses committed against children in Somalia, *urges* the Transitional Federal Government to develop and implement a concrete time-bound action plan to halt the recruitment and use of children, *requests* the Secretary-General to continue his dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government in this regard, and *reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General to strengthen the child protection component of UNPOS and to ensure continued monitoring and reporting of the situation of children in Somalia;

25. *Expresses* serious concern about increasing reports of conflict-related sexual violence in Somalia, *calls on* all parties to cease such violations and abuses, and *requests* the Secretary-General to implement the relevant provisions of resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009) and 1960 (2010), including the strengthening of the women's protection component of UNPOS;

26. *Demands* all parties and armed groups to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and supplies, and *further demands* that all parties ensure full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance across Somalia;

27. *Requests* the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative for Somalia and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to redouble their efforts to coordinate effectively and develop an integrated approach to all activities of the United Nations system in Somalia, to provide good offices and political support for the efforts to establish lasting peace and stability in Somalia, and to mobilise resources and support from the international community for both the immediate recovery and long-term economic development of Somalia taking into account the recommendations contained in his report (S/2009/684), and *stresses* the importance that UNPOS and other United Nations offices and agencies work transparently and coordinate with the international community;

28. *Requests* the strengthening of cooperation among IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations to allow for an appropriate division of responsibilities in Somalia in an effort to reduce duplication of effort and ensure proper utilization of resources, and to include updates on this topic in the Secretary-General's regular reports on Somalia;

29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on all aspects of this resolution every four months and *expresses* its intention to review the situation, as part of his reporting obligations, as specified in the statement of the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30) and Security Council resolutions, 1863 (2009), 1872 (2009), 1910 (2010) and 1964 (2010);

30. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.